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Abstract
Supply security is a prominent and crucial notion which finds application in var-
ious economic sectors (energy security, food security, supply chain risks). Yet,
it remains particularly difficult to define and measure. Currently used indica-
tors of supply security focus on narrow approaches and offer limited guidance
to policy makers. Considering this, we propose a novel indicator assessing the
supply security of industries, conceptually or physically, based on a network
structure. The indicator is based on a simulation methodology and evaluates
the reaction of the market to disruptions of its network services, thereby cap-
turing the various dimensions of supply security. Subsequently, we perform an
exemplary application onto the European natural gas market, and evaluate the
impact of currently debated network extensions projects and policy measures.
Keywords: Supply Security, Natural Gas
1. Introduction
Queues in front of petrol stations, soaring commodity prices following geopo-
litical tensions or shortages in food supply are some of the common images that
come to one’s mind when evoking the notion of supply security. Albeit fre-
quently associated with energy, supply security—narrowly speaking ensuring a
stable supply—is a widely shared concern in numerous markets. Food supply
1This research has been carried out as part of the project ‘Modelling the Swiss Gas Market
in a European Context’; financed by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy Research Programme
Energy-Economy-Society (EWG) and within the framework of SCCER CREST (Swiss Com-
petence Center for Energy Research, www.sccer-crest.ch), which is financially supported by
the Innosuisse under Grant No. 1155002547.
security or supply chain disruption risks are two examples thereof. Moreover,
diversity, which is often argued to be the main driver of supply security (see
notably Stirling, 1998), is a notion of considerable importance in economics—
for instance as a hedge against “ignorance” or as a driver of innovation and
growth—as well as in natural sciences. Applications of diversity can found in fi-
nance (portfolio diversification), international trade (foreign trade dependence)
or industrial organization (market concentration).
Understanding, evaluating and assessing the impact of security of supply
on a market is a crucial undertaking. First, interruptions of supply can result
in significant negative economic consequences, especially in the context of food
or commodities like metals and energy. Second, price spikes related to supply
insecurity affect consumers, who are often captive and characterized by inelastic
reactions. Last, various policies and measures are regularly implemented with
the hope to meliorate the supply security of numerous goods. Hence, a clear
and precise indicator of supply security allowing to evaluate the situation on a
given market and to assess different projects or policies is of utmost interest.
While a notion of central importance, supply security is not easy to define.
In the context of energy, the IEA describes it as the: “uninterrupted availability
of energy sources at an affordable price”2. However, many different aspects and
dimensions can be related to the security of supply. Kruyt et al. (2009) highlight
four of the main ones: the (physical) availability of supply, its accessibility
(i.e. geopolitical considerations), its affordability and its environmental or social
acceptability. Alternatively, supply security is often subdivided into short-term
security (mainly concerned with the resilience of the system to an outer shock)
and the long-term one (linked with the diversification of the supply portfolio
and the adequacy of the system).
Numerous indicators attempting to describe and quantify supply security
have been designed over the years. Analyses of the diversification of the supply-
mix are a classical basis for supply security evaluations. These indicators are
often based on the Shannon-Wiener index (e.g. Jansen et al., 2004) or on the
Herfindhal-Hirschmann one (Le Coq & Paltseva, 2009). Further, one finds ag-
gregate indicators aiming at identifying and quantifying the main drivers of en-
ergy (in)security (see notably the Supply/Demand indicator of Scheepers et al.,
2006). Alternative approaches rely on energy market models used as case study
to assess the reaction of a market in a defined crisis scenario. Finally, the Euro-
pean Union bases its evaluation on the so-called “N-1 rule” which assesses the
capability of a country to cope with the disruption of its single largest infras-
tructure (European Commission, 2014b).
These established approaches come with significant restrictions and offer
limited guidance to their users. Diversity-based indicators, for instance, solely
assess the current diversification of supplier portfolios, disregarding potential
substitutes which might be used in a crisis case. Simulation approaches, on
the other hand, are usually restricted to the study of a single classical scenario.
2http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/
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Finally, the N-1 rule is a purely static approach, thus neglecting the global mar-
ket dynamics. Overall, the approaches are often limited to a single dimension
and do not reflect the broad nature of supply security. The various limitations
of the existing methodologies restrict their range of application and appeal for
a comprehensive and flexible indicator tackling supply security in its various
dimensions.
Against this background, we propose a novel approach to evaluate the sup-
ply security of industries that are, physically or conceptually, dependent on a
network. We formulate an indicator reflecting the capability of a market to
secure the supply in a crisis situation. Specifically, our indicator measures the
ability of a market to cope with various interruptions of the network services.
The causes for interruption can be numerous, such as, e.g., technical breakdown
of a transmission line, collapse of exporting countries following geopolitical tur-
moil or failure of a supplier to comply with the contract’s terms. Our indicator
measures the impact of these crises on the market by analyzing the change in
consumer surplus. The results of each disruption scenario are then weighted by
a risk factor, and aggregated into a synthetic compound indicator, thus leading
to a quantification of the overall supply security.
Our indicator attempts at correcting for some of the caveats of currently
used methodologies. We follow the idea of Stirling (1998) assessing diversity as
the diversification of the supplier portfolio. We further cover both the short-
term perspective of supply security (i.e. short-term availability, ability to cope
with extreme events) and the long-term one by assessing the adequacy of the
system. Last, related to the definition of Kruyt et al. (2009), we integrate both
the quantity dimensions of supply security (availability, accessibility) as well as
its price dimension (affordability). To the best of our knowledge, there exists no
indicator both relying on a detailed representation of the supply side and taking
into account consumers’ reactions. Moreover, our methodology can be used on
various types of markets, and might further be applied as a policy evaluation
tool.
Using the European gas market as exemplary application, we compute our
indicator and compare it to several commonly used supply security metrics.
Subsequently, we make use of the proposed approach to assess a set of four
projects, which are commonly thought to have a positive effect on the European
security of gas supply. Specifically, we test two different gas network extension
projects (the Nord Stream 2 and the Southern Gas Corridor), investments into
additional LNG import capacity as well as the implementation of a strategic
storage obligation at the European level. Our indicator, alongside other metrics,
allows to evaluate the impact of these projects on energy security. Moreover,
the variance and the range of differences between the considered indicators will
highlight the complexity of estimating supply security.
2. Literature
As highlighted in the introduction, supply security is a broad and difficult to
define notion that encompasses various aspects and dimensions. As the crucial
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importance of supply security has long been identified, numerous research efforts
have been devoted to its definition and evaluation.
2.1. Conceptualizations
Supply security. The notion emerged in the 1970s in the context of energy, no-
tably in relation to the two oil shocks which led to soaring oil prices. Initially,
import dependency was considered as the first and foremost driver of energy
insecurity. The notion subsequently widened over time, for instance Bohi et al.
(1996) defined it as “the loss of economic welfare that may occur as a result of
a change in the price or availability of energy”. This definition emphasizes on
the economical and on the physical availability dimensions. Stern (2002) uses
a similar approach, and adds a distinction between the short-term availability
of supply and the long-term adequacy of supply and infrastructure (i.e. being
able to deliver supply). In addition, he differentiates the operational security
(i.e. coping with seasonal peak demand or extreme weather) from the strategic
security (i.e. collapse of major supply sources). Subsequent definitions addi-
tionally consider the environmental dimension as an essential feature of supply
security (see e.g. Jewell, 2011).
Finally, Kruyt et al. (2009) synthesize the various definitions by propos-
ing four dimensions: the (physical or geological) availability, the accessibility
(geopolitical aspects), the affordability (i.e. the economical dimension) and
the acceptability (environmental and social elements). One also finds diverging
opinions. Chester (2010) denounces the lack of attention dedicated to defining
the notion of energy security, considering the common definitions to be “blurred”
and “elusive”. She underlines the multi-dimensional and context-dependent na-
ture of supply security, and calls for indicators based on four dimensions: avail-
ability, adequacy of capacity, affordability and sustainability. For a thorough
review of the various definitions of supply security and its various dimensions,
one can notably refer to Winzer (2012).
Diversity. A parallel yet independent notion is the one of diversity. Stirling
(2010) defines it as the “pursuit of an evenly balanced reliance on a variety of
mutually disparate options”. Diversity is a notion of broad relevance in eco-
nomics. Portfolio diversification is certainly the best-known concept of finance
theory. Its basic rationale (“do not put all your eggs in the same basket”)
finds application in numbers of domains in economics including supply security.
Further applications are to be found in finance (Markowitz, 1952) or economic
growth theory (see e.g. Frenken et al., 2007). Stirling (1998) recognizes this rel-
evance, and proposes a general characterization of diversity in three dimensions:
variety, balance and disparity.
2.2. Indicators
Since supply security is a context-dependent notion, its measurement is nec-
essarily an arduous task. Assigning a numerical value, ranking or even con-
ceptually evaluating a loosely defined concept is by essence a slippery attempt.
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Sovacool & Mukherjee (2011) listing more than 350 different indicators of energy
security is rather symptomatic of this fact.
Simple metrics. As a first approximation, simple indicators of supply security
can be used. In the context of energy, resource estimates or reserves to produc-
tions ratios provide a rough assessment of a fossil fuel’s remaining duration of
usage under current conditions. Alternatively, one can also take into account
indicators such as the energy intensity of an economy, the share of fossil fuels
or the import dependency of various energy carriers. In a non-energy context,
the market share of each supplier, the proportion of long-term contracts or the
share of high-risk suppliers and routes might be further considered.
These metrics allow to grasp the dependence of a market on given commodi-
ties, suppliers or routes. Yet, their narrow coverage and simplistic approach
limit their usage to crude assessments. Moreover, they cover a single dimension
of supply security, and are limited to static assessments.
Diversity-based indices. A further strand of indicators is characterized by the
recourse to the notion of diversity as the key driver of energy security. As
portfolio diversification in finance, diversity is regarded as a simple yet powerful
method for mitigating risks.
Stirling (1998) argues that diversity is best represented by the Shannon
index, a metric commonly used in other fields of study like biology or ecology.
Neumann (2004) (and later von Hirschhausen & Neumann (2013)) introduce
an extension of the Shannon index to assess supply security. Their approach
integrates a political risk index as well as the ratio of domestic production
to the evaluation of supply sources diversification. Building upon this idea,
Jansen et al. (2004) propose four different long-term indicators derived from
the Shannon index, notably considering the diversity of energy sources and of
the imports thereof, the political risks and the level of resource depletion.
In parallel, other indicators of diversification have been used as basis for
energy security evaluation. The Herfindhal-Hirschmann index (HHI), which is
commonly known as a measure of the concentration of firms in a market, is
notably used by Le Coq & Paltseva (2009). They construct separate metrics
for oil, gas and coal which consider the diversification of import sources, the
political and transit risks as well as the economical impact of a disruption.
In turn, Stirling (2010) proposes a comprehensive framework to assess energy
security; his heuristic approach reflects the three dimensions of diversity: variety,
balance and disparity.
There are two main limitations to the aforementioned diversity-based indices.
First, they evaluate the diversification of supplier portfolios on a static basis.
The current diversification is measured, disregarding potential alternatives and
substitutes. For instance, a customer who chose a supplier out of various com-
peting offers might still be able to obtain supply from one of the turned down
alternatives in case of trouble with the chosen supplier. Moreover, a consumer
benefiting from a well balanced portfolio may nonetheless be exposed to short-
ages in the event of delivery interruptions from one of the suppliers and that
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the remaining providers lack the technical capacity to augment their deliveries.
Since the diversity-based indicators only consider the realized market shares,
they neither recognize a substitution alternative nor technical limitations of the
current portfolio, thus yielding an incomplete evaluation of the situation.
Second, these indicators measure supply security along the sole dimension of
the portfolio diversification. Yet, numerous other factors influence supply secu-
rity; to name a few: the reaction of the demand and supply side, the possibility
to stockpile the goods or the nature of the commercial relationships.
Other aggregated indices. The supply-demand (S/D) indicator has been devel-
oped by Scheepers et al. (2006) on the account of the European Commission. It
aggregates numerous factors related to supply security into a single index, and
adopts a holistic approach of the energy supply chain. The factors, which are
either linked to the demand for energy (energy-intensity) or to its supply (e.g.
import and transport capacity, share of renewable sources or storage adequacy)
are then weighted to yield a quantitative assessment of the supply security.
In parallel, the IEA has developed two aggregated indices (Lefevre, 2007).
The first one is based on a HHI and captures the price dimension of energy
security through the market concentration of suppliers, the political risks thereof
and the relative share of each energy source in the energy mix. The second
one measures the physical unavailability of gas by considering the share of oil-
indexed and pipe-based gas imports over the total primary energy supply. The
rationale is based on the belief that pipeline supply rules out the option of a
rapid switch between energy sources.
Additionally, the IEA has further developed the Model of Short-term Energy
Supply (MOSES) (Jewell, 2011), aggregating various risk and resilience factors
related to the external and domestic dimensions of different energy carriers. This
comprehensive approach assigns numerical ranges for the value of each factor
to classify them into three categories (low, medium and high level). Once all
factors are weighted and combined, the MOSES yields a single index evaluating
the short-term security of supply
These aggregated indicators suffer two mains caveats. First, they repre-
sent an ex-post evaluation of the situation on a given market. Hence, they offer
limited guidance for decision-makers when evaluating the impact of various poli-
cies or infrastructure projects on supply security. Second, they consider the sole
static viewpoint and disregard dynamic aspects, such as demand adaptation
to shocks or global market trends. Thereby, they might yield an unrealistic
assessment of the situation.
Stress test and simulation approaches. A parallel strand of research uses tech-
niques of energy market modeling to evaluate the security of supply. Here, the
evaluation is usually based on the implementation of a shock scenario on a model
and the assessment of its consequences. Richter & Holz (2015) use, for instance,
the scenario of a disruption of the Russian supply to test the resilience of the
European natural gas market.
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The stress tests pursued by the European Union and inspired by the finan-
cial market stress tests are further examples of this methodology. These tests
attempt to model the impact of a supply disruption resulting from a selected
crisis scenario that puts strain on the supply of a market. For instance, Euro-
pean Commission (2014a) simulates the collapse of either the Russian-Ukrainian
pipeline or of all Russian exports both during a period of one and of six months.
Recently, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas
followed a similar approach to publish an union-wide study on the simulation
of gas supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios (ENTSOG, 2017). Their
study is based on a detailed technical model of the European gas system. They
identify various risk scenarios for the European gas system and simulate them
for three cases of peak demand. The collapse of the Russian-Ukrainian route
or the disruption of all exports from Algeria are, among others, tested in the
study. Simulation results are then interpreted in terms of demand curtailment.
The choice of scenario represents one of the main limitation of these ap-
proaches. They often tend to solely consider scenarios that have occurred in the
past or that might seem likely to one’s mind. In doing so, relevant cases might be
overseen. Furthermore, these approaches lack a unified indicator for the quan-
tification of supply security, as they generally rely on ad hoc assessments or are
interpreted qualitatively. Finally, the studies tend to provide a detailed techni-
cal formulation of the supply, but neglect the demand side, thereby disregarding
its adaptation possibilities.
EU’s approach. Lastly, an approach regularly used in the evaluation of en-
ergy security is the so-called N-1 rule developed by the European Commission.
This rule is both a methodology to evaluate supply security and a “minimum
standard” of security which all member states must comply with (European
Commission, 2014b). The rule aims at determining whether a country is ca-
pable of satisfying its demand in spite of the disruption of its single largest
infrastructure—be it an import, transport or production infrastructure. The
disruption represents an extreme event with a statistical probability of once in
20 years (European Commission, 2010). Market-based demand-side measures
are also considered in fulfilling the obligation.
This methodology presents two majors caveats. First, the assessment is a
purely static one. Therefore, it neglects market dynamics, for instance global
shortages in supply which could result in energy insecurity even when complying
with the N-1 rule. Second, the analysis is limited to a single scenario of dis-
ruption, whereas a network often consists of numerous nodes and lines that are
crucial to its functioning. Owing to these flaws, the N-1 might yield unrealistic
evaluations of supply security.
3. Methodology
The previous literature review highlights the limitations of the current indi-
cators of supply security. Before explaining our attempt at filling this gap, we
first address the question of what such an indicator should be capable of.
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3.1. Requirements for an indicator
A first requirement for an indicator is the basic validity of its assessment.
In other words, the approach must correctly depict the relevant driving factors
of supply (in)security to yield an appropriate evaluation.
Second, the indicator should be capable of reflecting the broad and context-
dependent nature of supply security. Existing indicators are often concentrated
on a single dimension (usually the physical availability of supply), thus neglect-
ing further important aspects like price security, geopolitical considerations or
global market dynamics. Moreover, the indicator should be able to take into
account the relation and interaction between various factors impacting supply
security. Again, current approaches tend to focus on an unique factor. In the
context of energy security for instance, most approaches assess the sole diver-
sification of supply portfolios, without considering additional factors such as
demand flexibility or the possibility to store the goods.
A third requirement for an indicator is its practicability. Given the strategi-
cal prominence of the markets concerned by supply security issues, the designed
indicator should be applicable for policy or project evaluation. As a tool for
policy evaluation, the metrics would ideally allow to assess the effect on supply
security of various policies or infrastructure projects. In parallel, the reading
and understanding of the index should be kept simple and straightforward, so
that decision makers obtain a clear and quick overview of its main message.
Last, an indicator should be formulated in an as generic as possible manner.
Intended here is its applicability to various markets, be it to different energy
carriers, to specific food markets and to various commodities or international
supply chains. Albeit addressing heterogeneous situations, a unified framework
ensures a common ground for the different markets, which allows for compara-
bility between them and uniform methodological standards.
3.2. Proposed framework
Bearing in mind the aforementioned requirements, we propose a novel ap-
proach to evaluate supply security of industries which rely on a network. The
network can be physical with nodes representing different production or de-
mand locations connected by arcs representing transmission infrastructure (e.g.
roads, oil pipelines or electrical lines). The network can also be purely concep-
tual with node representing producers and demand actors and arcs depicting
their relationships (e.g. contracts or information exchange).
We evaluate supply security by simulating interruptions of the single compo-
nents of the networks, i.e., nodes and arcs. Thereby, we ask the basic question,
how the market is reacting to this interruption. In doing so, we assess the ability
of a market to cope with possible crisis situations and study the welfare impacts
of these, both in terms of quantity and of prices. To measure the reaction of
the market, we focus on the impact of the interruptions on consumer surplus.
The nature and the origin of the potential network interruptions depend
on the considered market. An explosion in a production plant, a (geo)political
dispute leading to the interruption of deliveries, a supplier’s failure to meet the
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contract’s terms or the breakdown of cargo freight supply chains are some exam-
ples. As a generalization, one can model all possible interruptions as disruptions
of the two elements building the network: a node or a line. Our indicator relies
on the study of these disruptions; their choice and design is to be performed
carefully and in relation with the considered market. One should identify the
potential sources of disruption on the market (e.g. technical, geopolitical or
congestion) and their average duration based on a historical data-driven ap-
proach. These disruptions are then translated into scenarios of lines or node
interruptions. Correcting for the caveat of the case studies literature, the cho-
sen scenarios should cover the iterative disruption of all network elements. As
an example, if explosions in oil production plants are identified as a potential
cause of supply disruption, one should successively simulate this scenario for all
oil producing nodes of the network.
After having measured the impact of each disruption on consumer surplus,
the final step of our methodology consists in the aggregation of all results into
a single metrics. To that end, the results are weighted by risk factors and,
finally, averaged; thereby, one obtains a highly readable and tractable compound
indicator of supply security. It is to be noted that the choice of potential sources
of disruption is not restricted to a single one. When more than one set of
scenarios is identified as relevant for the industry, the results of different sets
can be further aggregated into a unique compound indicator.
Evaluation procedure. The evaluation and quantification procedure of our indi-
cator pursues the following approach. First, a theoretical model of the consid-
ered market is set up. The model should synthesize the interactions of the main
actors on the market (e.g. profit-maximizing producers, benevolent welfare-
maximizing leader, etc.), its network dimension (e.g. transport or transmission
network and the appropriate constraints) as well as further relevant economical
or technical constraints (e.g. import capacity, long-term contracts, etc.). The
model is then calibrated with real market data.
In the second step, interruption scenarios are designed. Scenarios are struc-
tured in scenarios classes c ∈ C which bundle scenarios of the same type. A
scenario class might, e.g., be the failure of pipelines due to technological risk,
the default of suppliers due to political risk, or alike. Within a scenario class,
we have different scenarios i ∈ Ic. In the case of a scenario class representing
pipeline failures due to technical risk a scenario would be the failure of a single
pipeline. Thus, the set of scenarios Ic would include the technical disruption
of all pipeline (and maybe combinations of pipeline disruptions). Each of these
scenarios i is evaluated with a probability of occurrence ωic.
For each of the scenarios, we calculate the market outcome. The impact of
the interruption on economic welfare in a given country n is computed as the
change in consumer surplus relative to the base case without any interruption:
CScrisisicn
CSbasen
where CSbasen is the consumer surplus in country n without any inter-
ruption. Likewise, CScrisisicn is the consumer surplus in country n realized under
scenario i in scenario class c.
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To obtain a single indicator of supply security in country n, we first aggregate
the relative change in consumer surplus in each scenario class using occurrence
probability. Afterwards, we aggregate indicators of all classes to single indicator
using class weights λc which are restricted to sum to one (
∑
c λc = 1). Formally,








Remarks on the evaluation procedure. Focusing on the consumer surplus allows
to measure both the quantity and the price effects—lower quantities supplied or
higher prices— and to capture the adverse welfare impacts born by consumers.
Another possibility would have been to consider the total welfare impact—
consumer and producer surpluses; yet, as producers and importers might ben-
efit from the shortage in supply thanks to higher prices, we opt for the sole
consideration of the impact on consumers. Moreover, the concerns and policies
around security of supply are mainly concentrated on the consumer, rarely on
the producers. Finally, using the ratio of consumer surplus allows to normalize
the impact of each crisis; this ensures comparability, notably when the indicator
is used as a policy evaluation tool.
The formulation used for our indicator allows for a direct and simple in-
terpretation of its results. A value of 1.0 highlights a country which is never
affected by an interruption, be it in terms of missing supply or of increasing
prices. Below 1.0 values represent, on the contrary, the average loss of welfare
caused by the crises and which must be born by the consumers. The lower the
values, the more severe the losses.
3.3. Relation to current indicators and requirements
Our indicator aims at overcoming some of the previously mentioned caveats
of current methodologies. First, our methodology blends together various di-
mensions of the notion of supply security. As many others indicators, we assess
the portfolio diversification, yet in a broader and more precise manner. Through
the simulation of network service interruptions, alternatives to the current mix
must be developed, if possible. These alternatives might be the augmentation of
deliveries from an existing supplier or the recourse to a not yet used option (e.g.
a concurrent supplier whose offer was previously turned down because of its
higher cost). In addition to diversification, we further evaluate both the short-
term resilience of the market (i.e. whether the demand can be fully satisfied)
and the overall alignment of supply and demand in a longer term perspective.
Moreover, we integrate the categorization of Kruyt et al. (2009) by directly
assessing the availability, the accessibility and the affordability dimensions of
supply security.
Second, one of the main novelties of our approach is the integration of both
supply and demand dynamics. We model the elastic reaction and adaptation of
consumers to price changes, whereas most of the current indicators rely on a fix
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demand (among others the diversity-based indicators or simulation approaches).
Moreover, our model integrates global market dynamics for a sound assessment
of the available supply, notably in opposition to the static approach followed
by the N-1 rule or the diversity-based literature. To the best of our knowledge,
there exists no indicator capable of reflecting both demand and supply dynam-
ics. We thereby achieve a broader and more realistic evaluation than existing
methodologies.
Third, our approach is not restricted to the study of the sole diversification of
supplier portfolios. Indeed, depending on the considered market, various factors
can play a significant role in the security of supply. Storage—of goods, energy,
food or commodities—is for instance a prominent driver of security. Our flexible
methodology allows to take these additional factors into account.
Fourth, our methodology opts for a probabilistic-like approach. To obtain a
broad picture, we do not restrict the design of the scenarios to those that seem
possible to one’s mind, but investigate all potential sources of disruption of the
network services. The amount of scenarios considered thus allows for a more
realistic assessment of possible future crises.
Last, the chosen methodology allows to apply our indicator in various set-
tings. The simulated market might mimic current conditions, but one might also
take into account forecasted demand trends or projected infrastructures. Thus,
our metrics can be used as a comparison tool between different settings. More
specifically, various supply security-related policies or project (for instance net-
work expansion projects or demand-side management policies) can be evaluated
and compared with our model based indicator.
4. Empirical Application: Model and Indicator Design
As a first exemplary application of our methodology, we study the European
natural gas market; an obvious choice since it possesses many interesting features
for our indicator. First, the market is highly dependent on its network—here
materialized by the pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) networks. Second,
the security of gas supply is a recurrent topic, notably driven by geopolitical
concerns (see e.g. the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and
2009). The uneven geographical distribution of the gas reserves reinforces its
sensitivity to supply insecurity. Last, the liberalization of the European market
and the rise of a global LNG market changed the playing field on the market,
thereby also impacting the supply security. Following we will shortly present
the underlying model structure as well as the scenario classes and elasticity
assumptions for designing the indicator.
4.1. Model structure
We use the gas market model developed in Abrell et al. (2019) as basis
for our empirical implementation. The model relies on a partial equilibrium
optimization; a common approach in natural gas market modeling. Included
are the main actors along the supply chain: gas extractors, pipeline and LNG
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shippers, storage operators and final gas users. We use a monthly formulation to
capture the seasonal dynamics inherent to the gas consumption. The focus is set
on the European market, with one node per country; the linkage to the global
market is ensured by aggregated regional hubs. Overall, we cover approximately
98% of the worldwide demand and supply in the model.
The network infrastructure is represented by the cross-border pipeline ca-
pacities between each country. The model further considers the worldwide LNG
liquefaction (export) and regasification (import) terminals, as well as the storage
infrastructure.
We assume perfectly competitive market participants, so that we formulate
the model as a social welfare maximization problem. Although imperfectly
behaving producers are regularly used in natural gas modeling (see notably
Egging et al., 2010), this assumption allows us to keep the model reasonably
sized and traceable, so that it can be solved for numerous iterations. In parallel,
the model is formulated in a flexible manner, and can thus accommodate various
scenarios, such as the implementation of additional network infrastructures or
of policies.
Data on the gas market and its infrastructure is subsequently added to the
model, and the results are calibrated to the 2012-2014 period. More details on
the model formulation and its calibration can be found in Abrell et al. (2019).
4.2. Disruption scenarios
For this application, we consider three classes of possible interruptions. First,
the technical failures of pipelines. Second, the outage of a gas supplying coun-
tries for political reasons. Third, the disruption of pipelines due to political
reasons. Table 1 summarizes the designed interruption scenarios and their
weighting strategies. All scenarios classes have equal weights in the indica-
tor (λc = 1/3). Possible shocks affecting the European gas market display a
vast range of duration. We implement all disruptions lasting four months during
winter (December to March), when gas consumption is peaking.
The technical failures of pipelines is, e.g., to an explosion or to severe leaking
of a pipeline. Such a disruption is equivalent to the deletion of an arc within the
European pipeline grid. We allow all cross-border pipelines to become disrupted.
I.e., the failure of a single pipeline is one scenario within this scenario class.
According to OGP (2010) technical failures depend linearly on the length of the
pipeline. Thus, we use this length to weight scenarios within the scenario class
(ωic).
Gas producing countries might default due to geopolitical reasons like wars
or major internal turmoil. This represents the disruption of a node in the
European natural gas market. In these scenario, the country’s complete gas
infrastructure is disrupted and its demand set to zero. We weight scenarios
using the World Governance Index “political stability and absence of violence”
provided by World Bank (2016).
Pipelines might also become disrupted due to geopolitical tensions between
two countries. For this class, we simulate the disruptions of all major European
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import channels (e.g. Algeria-Spain, Libya-Italy, Russia-Ukraine, etc.). We
use again the World Government Index as weighting factors for single scenarios
(World Bank, 2016).
Table 1: Disruption classes
c Scenario Type ωic λc
1 Technical pipeline failure Line Length of pipeline 1
3
2 Geopolitical country collapse Node World governance index 1
3
3 Geopolitical pipeline failure Line World governance index 1
3
Note: Summary of the three sets of disruptions simulated, with the nature of the scenarios,
the type of network failure, the chosen weights. Worldwide governance indicator corresponds
to (World Bank, 2016)’s “political stability and absence of violence”.
4.3. Short-term and long-term perspectives
As the indicator is based on the consumer surplus the underlying assum-
tion on the demand elasticity is crucial for estimating supply security impacts.
However, the demand elasticity of gas diverges strongly depending on the con-
sidered time horizon. In a short-term perspective, numerous consumers are
captive, with limited substitution alternatives (e.g. households using gas as
heating fuel). From a longer-term viewpoint, consumers may adapt and sub-
stitute more easily. Households may opt for new heating or cooking systems,
while firms might invest in alternative technologies.
To account for this discrepancy, we compute our indicator twice; once in a
short-term and once in a long-term perspective. The main difference between
a short and a long-term setting should be the possibility for agents to invest
in substitutes. Since the model we use for our empirical implementation does
not allow to simulate investment behaviors, we approximate this difference with
higher demand elasticities in the long-term case.
In order to maintain comparability between the short and the long-term
cases, we simulate the exact same disruption scenarios in both cases. Thus,
the sole difference between the two setting lies in the demand elasticities. More
details on the formulation of the long-term case can be found in appendix Ap-
pendix A.
5. Empirical Application: Assessment of European Gas Supply Secu-
rity
We apply our indicator to evaluate the European gas supply security under
different circumstances. First, in the base case case we apply the indicator to
the current situation in Europe, i.e., under demand, supply, and infrastructure
conditions as we observe them today. We perform this evaluation for the short-
and long-run perspective. Moreover, we compare the result of our indicator with
the results of other metrics used to measure security of supply.
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Second, as stated in Section 3, our methodology finds application both in a
general assessment of supply security and as a policy evaluation tool for mea-
sures aiming at enhancing security. We build upon our application of the Euro-
pean natural gas market, and use our indicator to evaluate three infrastructure
projects and one policy, which are broadly considered as positive for the Euro-
pean gas security.
Specifically, we compare the following projects:
• SGC & Reverse Flow – Combining two different projects: first, the South-
ern Gas Corridor (SGC): a three parts project consisted of the South Cau-
casus Pipeline (SCP), the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) connecting Azerbaijan to Italy through
Turkey and Greece. Second, the Reverse Flow project: the opening of
a South-North route from Italy to Germany and Belgium thanks to the
technical transformation of the existing pipelines.
• LNG – Several additional LNG regasification terminals are currently planned
in Europe, notably in Croatia, France, Spain and Sweden3.
• NordStream 2 – Extension of the Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia
to Germany, resulting in the doubling of its transport capacity.
• Stategic storage – Implementation of a strategic storage policy at EU-level.
We simulate a policy imposing the holding of a minimum of 30% of the
storage capacity as a strategic reserve from November to December and of
20% from January to February. The strategic reserve may only be used in
case of crisis on the market or at the end of the period. We formulate the
policy analog to Abrell et al. (2019), yet with a more flexible approach.
5.1. Baseline
5.1.1. European gas supply security
In Table 2, our indicator displays contrasted results on the European se-
curity of gas supply. A large share of countries are graded with a high score,
among others Belgium, France or Switzerland. Five states score 0.990 or higher,
meaning than, on average, the crises lead to a consumer surplus reduction of less
than 1%. On the other hand, numerous countries achieve poor results. Ukraine,
Finland and Turkey achieve the three lowest scores, with welfare reductions of
up to 5%. All three are heavily dependent on Russian gas—the entire Finish
demand stems from Russia, while 69% of the Ukrainian and 33% of the Turkish
ones are supplied by Moscow. In general, Western Europe tends to score high
in the indicator. This is notably explained by the important interconnections
of the network in Western Europe which allows for numerous alternatives.
3The list of LNG and storage projects can be retrieved from Gas Infrastructure Europe
(2015)
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One further notices from Table 2 that countries which can rely on domestic
extraction tend to do well in our indicator. Denmark, Hungary, and Great
Britain all score above the average, notably thanks to their self-sufficiency ratio.
Nonetheless, one also finds evident counterexamples like Ukraine, Poland or,
to a lesser extent, Romania. Additionally, Austria, Belgium or France prove
that countries with high import dependency are not necessarily supply insecure.
Their geographical location allow them to rely on a variety of import canals—for
instance Belgium has direct pipeline connections with Norway, the Netherlands,
the UK and Germany, in addition to a LNG receiving terminal.











AUT 98.9 99.6 - - 3
BEL 99.4 99.7 - 46% 4
CHE 99.2 99.6 - - 3
CRO 98.8 99.2 - - 2
CZE 98.5 99.0 7% - 2
DNK 98.9 99.0 131% - 1
ESP 98.8 99.4 - 213% 4
FIN 95.4 95.2 - - 1
FRA 99.0 99.5 - 58% 6
GBR 98.2 98.6 50% 66% 4
GER 98.5 98.8 15% - 8
GRC 97.1 97.8 - 88% 2
HUN 98.5 98.9 22% - 4
IRL 97.9 98.4 - - 1
ITA 97.5 98.7 12% 21% 5
POL 96.6 97.3 34% - 4
PRT 98.9 99.3 - 316% 1
ROU 97.6 97.6 86% - 2
SVK 99.0 99.5 - - 4
SVN 99.0 99.6 - - 2
SWE 98.9 99.1 - 65% 1
TUR 96.5 97.2 - 24% 4
UKR 94.6 95.1 45% - 3
Av. 98.1 98.5 17.5 39.0 3.1
St.dev 1.2 1.3 32.4 76.1 1.7
Note: Short and long-term values of Φ (in percent) for selected nodes. Additionally shown
are some indicators of factors influencing supply security: Self sufficiency is defined as
fraction of consumption served by domestic supply; ratio of LNG regasification capacity over
demand; number of pipelines with direct connection to the country.
Furthermore, one notes the overall positive impact of LNG on supply secu-
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rity. Countries like France, Belgium, Spain or Portugal use their vast regasifi-
cation capacities to ensure a diversified portfolio and a stable supply. On the
other end of the scale, Greece and Turkey achieve low values of the indicator Φ;
they seem to have insufficient import capacity to ensure a continuous supply in
every case.
Finally, there seems to exist an inverse relationship between the number
of pipeline connections and the value of our indicator. Countries with few
connections, for instance Finland or Romania, have less substitution alternatives
in case of a supplier disruption; they might, hence, be more prone to supply
insecurity. Some of these countries nonetheless achieve good levels of supply
security. Sweden for instance has a single direct liaison with Denmark, whom
is in turn linked with Germany; both countries scoring high in our indicator.
When relying on a single connection, the nature of one’s neighbor is of utmost
interest. Finland scores lower than countries in similar situations, notably owing
to its dependency on a somewhat unstable neighbor—Russia.
5.1.2. Short- vs. long-term perspective
The striking feature when comparing the long-term indicators to the short-
term ones in Table 2 is the overall higher level of supply security, with the sole
exception of Finland. On average, the countries face a 0.4 percentage point
smaller reduction of their consumer surplus; Italy even increases its score by 1.2
percentage points.
Our long-term assessment of supply security uses 50% higher demand elas-
ticities, allowing customers to substitute more towards alternative fuels or new
technologies. Consumers are thus less dependent on gas and adopt a more
flexible behavior. Therefore, one is not astonished that, for the vast majority
of countries, the long-term framework yields smaller welfare impacts than the
short-term one.
Two remarks are to be made at this point. First, we chose an important
difference between the short-term and long-term elasticities (increase of 50%)
which is not based on sound scientific research, but rather a rough approximation
aiming at sketching customer response. Hence, the results should not be taken
for their absolute values, but rather interpreted as qualitative assessments of
the impact of higher substitution alternatives for customers. Second, since our
indicator is a ratio of base case consumer surplus over crisis one, we solely assess
the percentage change in welfare, not its absolute value. Different elasticity
means different demand curve; therefore, a smaller percentage welfare change
does not automatically imply a smaller impact in absolute terms.
As a final note, there seem to be no significant difference in the ranking of
countries between the short and the long-term framework. The lowest scoring
countries stay on the bottom of the scale (e.g Turkey, Ukraine or Finland), the
medium scoring are in the middle in both cases (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany
or Great Britain), whereas the highest ranked one always achieve the best grades
(e.g. Belgium, France or Portugal).
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5.1.3. Comparison Security of Supply Metrics
In order to grasp how our metrics performs compared to other evaluation
methodologies, we further compare it to several commonly used indicators.
Specifically, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for supplier
concentration, the Shannon-Wiener one (SWI) as well as its augmented version,
the Shannon-Wiener-Neumann index (SWIN2) (von Hirschhausen & Neumann,
2013). In parallel, we also display some of the values of other metrics found in
the literature; namely the S/D indicator from Jansen & Seebregts (2010), the
REES from Le Coq & Paltseva (2009) and the EU’s N-1 (European Commission,
2014b).
Table 3 displays the value of our indicator Φn for selected European nodes
alongside the aforementioned indexes. Since all indicators use different scales
and to ensure the readability of the table, we cluster all indicators from one,
being the best achieved result, to five, the worst one.
Table 3: Comparison of Security of Supply Metrics
ΦSTn HHI SWI SWIN2 S/D REES N-1
AUT 2 4 4 4 4 5 2
BEL 1 4 4 2 4 2 1
CHE 1 1 1 1 n/a n/a 2
CRO 3 1 1 2 n/a n/a 4
CZE 3 2 1 3 2 4 1
DNK 2 5 5 5 1 1 2
ESP 3 4 4 4 n/a 2 3
FIN 5 5 5 5 4 3 4
FRA 1 3 3 1 2 2 3
GBR 4 3 4 2 1 1 3
GER 3 2 3 1 3 3 1
GRC 4 1 2 3 n/a 4 5
HUN 3 2 2 4 4 5 4
IRL 4 1 2 1 n/a 1 2
ITA 4 1 2 2 5 4 4
POL 5 5 5 5 3 2 4
PRT 2 3 3 2 5 3 4
ROU 4 3 4 4 2 4 3
SVK 1 4 5 5 5 5 1
SVN 2 2 1 3 n/a 3 5
SWE 2 3 2 3 2 1 5
TUR 5 2 3 4 n/a n/a n/a
UKR 5 5 5 5 n/a n/a n/a
Corr. - -0.02 0.17 0.28 -0.10 0 0.34
Note: Values of ΦSTn and of various supply security indicators for selected European nodes,
categorized from one (best achieved value) to five (worst achieved value). Correlation of each
indicator with ΦSTn .
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At first glance, one is struck by the heterogeneity of results among the indi-
cators. Unanimous evaluations represent an exception. Ukraine, which achieves
the lowest scores in all metrics, and Switzerland, that is awarded the highest
grades in all but one indicator, are the two best aligned countries—although
it must be noted that not all indicators are available for these two countries.
Rather well aligned results are for example: Finland, negatively judged by the
large majority of indices, Poland, by most of them, or Romania, always scoring
in the lower end of the scale. On the other hand, our Φ-indicator and the N-1
evaluate Austria as secure, whereas the rest of the literature sets the country
on the lower end of their scale. The opposite also happens, notably for Greece
or Italy, which obtain good results in the diversity-based indicators, but poor
ones in the rest. Undoubtedly, the context-dependent nature of supply security
and its blurred definition help to explain the heterogeneous results.
The correlation between the current metrics and our Φ-indicator allows to
grasp the overall alignment between the methodologies. The best fit is achieved
with the N-1 approach. Notwithstanding its limitations, the N-1 possesses some
similarities with our methodology in the definition of supply security and the
aspect covered, thus explaining the good alignment with our indicator. Further,
the correlation between our results and those von Hirschhausen & Neumann
(2013)’s SWIN2 is also important, notably explained by the indicator’s broader
stance on supply security than the simpler HHI or SWI. On the other hand,
the IEA’s S/D and the plain HHI both have a negative correlation with Φ,
while Le Coq & Paltseva (2009)’s REES displays a correlation of zero. Given
the important discrepancies in terms of methodology between these indices and
ours, one is not particularly surprised by this result. Again, the strongly diverse
nature of the supply security notion explain these deviations.
Summing up, we draw two main conclusions from the comparison of our
indicator to some of the currently used ones. First, the rather weak correlation
between our indicator and the established measurements—or even its absence in
some cases—cannot be interpreted as a negative sign for our methodology. All
indicators measure different dimensions of supply security, thereby necessarily
leading to diverse results. Moreover, the broadest approaches and those which
share common characteristics with ours—the N-1 or the SWIN2 for example—
display the strongest correlation. This confirms our belief that our methodology
covers more dimensions than the current ones. Second, the blurred definition of
supply security mechanically leads to very diverse approaches for its measure-
ment. Absent a common and accepted definition, it seems impossible to achieve
a common ground so that approaches can truly be compared to one another.
5.2. Policy and network infrastructure scenarios
As indicated above, our indicator can also be used to evaluate different
projects or policies aiming to improve supply security. Observing the indicator
values in Table 4 for the three infrastructure projects and the storage policy,
we notice that, generally speaking, the infrastructure scenarios have a rather
modest impact on the European gas security. A majority of countries obtain
approximately similar scores in Baseline and in LNG, NordStream 2 or SGC
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& Reverse Flow. Naturally, this holds for countries with an already high level
of supply security (among others Austria, Denmark, Spain, France or Sweden).
However, low grade ones (for instance Finland or Poland) also tend to be rela-
tively unaffected by the new infrastructures.
Table 4: Impact of Infrastructure extensions and policies on European Supply Security
Baseline SGC RvFl LNG NrdStrm StratSto
AUT 98.9 98.9 99.0 99.4 100.1
BEL 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.6 100.0
CHE 99.2 99.1 99.2 99.4 99.8
CRO 98.8 98.7 98.8 99.1 99.4
CZE 98.5 98.4 98.5 98.9 99.4
DNK 98.9 98.9 98.9 98.7 98.8
ESP 98.8 98.8 98.8 99.0 99.6
FIN 95.4 95.4 95.4 95.4 95.9
FRA 99.0 99.0 99.0 99.3 100.2
GBR 98.2 98.1 98.2 98.5 98.6
GER 98.5 98.4 98.5 98.7 99.0
GRC 97.1 97.9 97.2 97.3 98.2
HUN 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.8 98.9
IRL 97.9 97.8 97.9 98.3 98.5
ITA 97.5 97.5 97.6 98.0 99.0
POL 96.6 96.6 96.6 96.8 97.7
PRT 98.9 98.9 99.0 98.9 99.2
ROU 97.6 97.9 97.6 97.7 97.1
SVK 99.0 98.9 99.0 99.4 100.0
SVN 99.0 98.9 99.0 99.4 100.1
SWE 98.9 98.9 99.1 98.7 98.8
TUR 96.5 98.5 96.6 96.8 97.2
UKR 94.6 94.8 94.6 94.7 96.6
Mean 98.1 98.2 98.1 98.3 98.8
Std.dev. 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2
Note: Values of short-term indicator ΦSTn for various European countries under different
infrastructure and policy scenarios:Baseline, Nord Stream 2, SGC & Reverse Flow, LNG
and Strategic storage.
The SGC & Reverse Flow project has a limited impact for the European
natural gas security. On the one hand, countries directly concerned by the
pipeline projects, Greece and Turkey, both obtain a large improvements of their
score, up to two percentage points for the latter. On the other hand, neither
Italy nor the rest of Europe seems to be significantly impacted by the additional
pipelines.
The LNG setting also displays an overall minor impact, yet some individual
effects are to be noted. Additional regasification plants are planned in Spain,
France, and Sweden. Sweden sees its security improved thanks to its enhanced
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import capacity. France and Spain, since they already benefited from high levels
of supply security beforehand, do not, or only marginally, improve their score.
Croatia and Poland, who are also planning new LNG terminals, do not display
significant variations of their Φ-score. Indirectly, Portugal benefits from the
enhanced import capacity of its neighbors. Overall, our indicator shows limited
benefits of these additional LNG terminals for the European security of gas
supply.
The extension of the Nord Stream pipeline yield higher gains of supply se-
curity than the previously tested infrastructures. The positive effects are both
apparent for countries situated close to Germany (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France
or Switzerland), who benefit from its enhanced import capacity, and in regions
more remote (e.g. Croatia, Great Britain, Ukraine or Turkey). The latter are
indirectly impacted, as the Nord Stream 2 frees up capacity on other import
canals, be it from Russia (e.g. towards Ukraine or Turkey) or from further
sources (e.g. LNG import capacity).
In opposition to the rather mild effects of the infrastructure projects, our
indicator underlines the large gains of supply security achieved through the im-
plementation of a strategic storage policy. As highlighted in Abrell et al. (2019),
the policy leads to substantial increase in the average fullness of gas storage.
This additional gas is a welcome buffer in case of disruptions, as simulated in our
methodology. The buffer can both be used to cover one’s own demand and to be
shared among European countries. Hence, the effect is important for the play-
ers with significant storage capacities as well as for those with limited storage
facilities. Thanks to the policy, the vast majority of European countries obtain
higher score than without the storage obligation; the average result surges by
0.7 percentage point.
One further notes the presence of indicator values above one for some coun-
tries (Austria, Slovenia and France). Since we normalize the consumer surplus
during crisis over the one in the base case, this means that, on average, the
simulated interruption scenarios cause an augmentation of the welfare in these
countries—a puzzling result. Behind this fact lays a simple explanation. As
stated above, in the Stategic storage setting, we impose a minimum level of all
European storage during winter of successively 30% and 20%. This security
buffer might only be used in case of stress on the market (i.e. any interruption
of a line or collapse of a node) or once the winter is over. For many countries,
this lower limit forces them to hold more storage than they would optimally do;
hence, the policy yields additional costs for storage holders. The lower bound is
removed in all cases of crises, regardless of whether a country is actually affected
by the interruption or not. If a country is not impacted by the event, neither
in terms of quantity nor of price, but is still allowed to use its security buffer
sooner than in the base case, a crisis might turn out to be welfare enhancing
for him. Hence, provided a country is rarely impacted by the crises, its average
result might lie above the 1.0 value.4 Stategic storage underlines one of the
4This fact highlights a drawback of our indicator’s design when used for policy comparison.
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main contribution of our indicator: its broader approach. Indeed, the currently
established methodologies are not capable of considering the actual levels of
storage as a factor of supply security. Analyzing the positive impact of strategic
storage policy would hence prove impossible.
6. Conclusion
While a notion of crucial importance for numerous sectors—food, energy
or international trade to name a few— security of supply remains distinctively
characterized by a blurred definition and the lack of a broadly accepted mea-
surement method. The currently available methodologies usually rely on narrow
approaches, notably focusing on the assessment of the diversification of supplier
portfolios or on the simulation of case studies.
Against this background, we propose a novel approach aiming at measuring
and evaluating the supply security of industries which rely, physically or con-
ceptually, on a network. We adopt a broad methodology to address some of
the caveats of the currently used indices. Our indicator evaluates the impact
of various interruptions of the network services on the welfare of the concerned
markets, thus exploring supply security in its numerous dimensions. Specifically,
the methodology simulates a market model which is put under strain by various
scenarios of collapses of its network components (i.e. each line and node). We
then evaluate the impact of each crisis on consumer surplus to grasp both the
quantity effect (i.e. change in supply) and the price one (i.e. demand reaction).
The reduction in consumer surplus is subsequently weighted for each case and
averaged to construct our final metrics.
One of novelty of our approach is that we consider both, the demand and
the supply dynamics in our assessment, thereby ensuring a comprehensive state-
ment. The chosen methodology further helps to measure the current diversi-
fication of supply as well as the potential contributions of substitutes or of
additional techno-economical factors, such as storage. Moreover, we base our
indicator on the study of crisis scenarios for which we sequentially test all pos-
sible occurrences in the network. Finally, the chosen framework allows for the
evaluation and comparison of different policies or network extension projects.
To demonstrate the working of our indicator, we test it on the European
natural gas market. Our assessment of the current security of gas supply re-
veals contrasted results for the EU countries. The indicators notably highlights
the importance of the diversification of import sources, be it through numerous
import canals or through a central geographical position in the network, and of
The policy or the project simulated do not only impact the capability of the market to react
to the crises, they also have welfare implications absent any shortage event. Thereby, the
baseline on which the crisis consumer surplus is normalized is changed. One must keep this
in mind when comparing the different results. Our indicator can only be used to assess the
relative changes in welfare in the different cases not to derive quantitative estimations of the
difference in welfare impacts between various policies.
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self sufficiency ratio as drivers of supply security. Furthermore, countries pos-
sessing LNG import terminals tend to be better off. Subsequently, we compare
our indicator to some of the currently used ones. Significant divergences are
observed. The misalignment can notably be explained by the broader stance
and the more inclusive approach obtained through our novel indicator.
Finally, we perform a case study of four different measures which are thought
to be security of supply-enhancing. We assess the impact of two additional
pipelines (NordStream 2 and the Southern Gas Corridor project) as well as of
new LNG terminals in Europe. All three projects have rather limited benefits
for the European security of gas supply, whereas the most notable impacts
realize in countries directly concerned with the infrastructures. We further test
the implementation of a strategic storage policy, imposing a minimum level of
storage at the beginning of the winter. In turn, this policy yields substantial
gains of supply security, since it increases the security buffer of storage.
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Appendix A. Technical note on the long-term indicator
The nature of our model forces us to employ a counter-intuitive method to
compute the long-term indicator. The naive approach would have been to sim-
ply use different assumptions on elasticity, and redo the calculations. Yet, this
method prevents comparability between the short and the long-term perspec-
tives. Indeed, our model uses a reference point of observed price and quantities
on a given market, and assumes an elasticity to compute a linear demand.
Changing the elasticity thus means using a different demand curve. In a perfect
world, this would not pose a particular problem as both curves would cross each
others in the reference point. Yet, since a model is the simplified description of a
complex reality, notably in terms of demand curve, our model does not achieve
perfect calibration; hence, the model’s equilibrium point does not coincide with
the observed market one. Owing to this fact, with the aforementioned approach,
the two demand curves would cross at the observed market equilibrium, not at
the model one. Thereby, we would loose the possibility to compare the results
with each others.
To ensure comparability, we force the short and long-term demand curves to
cross at the model’s equilibrium. To do so, we compute the “achieved” point-
elasticity at the equilibrium point of the model. As we use linear demand, this
elasticity will be different from the one used for the model’s calibration. Once
the achieved point elasticity retrieved, we assume an increase of the elasticity
by 50% to obtain a long-term one. This process is repeated for each country,
consumption sector and time period.
The left part of figure A.1 displays a “perfect world” situation, where the
reference point used for the calibration and the model’s equilibrium coincide.
Here, the long-term demand (DLT ) can be derived simply with a different elas-
ticity. On the right part though, since we can only use an approximation of the
real supply curve (S˜), the model’s equilibrium is different than the reference
point. Thus, we have to rely on an approximated long-term demand (DLT )
which crosses the short-term one (DST ) and the approximated supply curve at
the model’s equilibrium.
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Figure A.1: Left: “perfect-world” formulation of long-term demand (DLT ) based on the
short-term one (DST ). Right: approximated long-term demand (DLT ) at model’s equilibrium
(crossing of S˜ and DST )
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